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CONFESSIONS AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED CAPITAL
DEFENDANT: CHEATING TO LOSE
BY: SILVIA LINDA SIMPSON
I. INTRODUCTION
The defense of mentally retarded clients presents unique challenges
:o both defense attorneys and the criminal justice system. Among the
-hallenges for counsel is first, to recognize and understand mental retar-
lation and how it differs from other impairments such as mental illness;
md second, to communicate this information to judges and juries, who
ire also largely ignorant in this area. All in the criminal justice system are
,ikewise challenged to understand the impact of mental retardation on
-xisting doctrines and legal rules. An important example is the law of
-onfessions. The special susceptibilities of the mentally retarded make
-hem especially vulnerable to both intentionally coercive police tactics
and inadvertent interrogation techniques. These challenges may stem
[rom problems that are particularly acute in Virginia, if the capital case of
Earl Washington is an example. Spurred in part by Washington's case, in
xhich a mentally retarded man, who confessed but was almost certainly
innocent, was nearly put to death, this article seeks to assist practitioners
in several ways.
First, the article will suggest indicators of mental retardation that
;hould be uncovered in the initial investigation and alert attorneys that
mental retardation may be a factor in their case. This is another reason in
zapital cases that the mitigation investigation, looking to the penalty trial,
must begin immediately upon acceptance of the case. Second, the article
will discuss the procurement of the number of experts and type of assis-
tance necessary to verify mental retardation and aid in presenting evi-
dence about it at those points in the case where it is highly relevant. Third,
the article will outline the importance of many characteristics of the men-
tally retarded to the law of confessions and discuss how these character-
istics interact with the interrogation context to produce unjust results.
Finally, the case of Earl Washington and his confession is discussed as a
reminder that we all must learn more about mental retardation. This
article is merely a glimpse into one of the important areas where mental
retardation is legally significant. Upon defense counsel, especially capi-
tal defense counsel, falls the primary responsibility for educating himself,
judges, jurors, and prosecutors about mental retardation.
II. "SPOTTING THE ISSUE": IDENTIFYING
INDICATORS OF MENTAL RETARDATION
The first hurdle in dealing with mental retardation is identifying its
presence. A mentally retarded individual's denial of his disability and his
well-developed mechanisms to disguise his disability or "pass" make
detection of his disability particularly difficult. Therefore, one's own
interaction with a client is often not a reliable indicator. While it is always
good practice to test a defendant, it is particularly crucial when certain
indicators are present. These indicators are usually found in school
1 This. comprehensive collection of data is also critical in formulat-
ing a theory of mitigation early in the defense preparation.
2 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
3 Hereinafter "3:1."
4 American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental
Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support (1992).
This definition revises the previous definition of mental retardation:
"Mental Retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectu-
al functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
and manifested during the developmental period." American Association
records which show consistently deficient IQ test performance, poor
grades, recommendations for special education, repeated grades, and a
general trend of failure. Other helpful indicators also include information
from the defendant's family and friends, whose wide range of experience
with him over a long period of time may more accurately measure his
abilities.
Information helpful to the spotting and documentation of mental
deficits can also be found by compiling a comprehensive life history. This
collection of data should begin with the conception of the defendant,
investigating the mother's pregnancy and whether she used drugs and
alcohol during pregnancy, and continue through the defendant's life.
Documentation should come from a variety of sources including school
records, welfare department records, employment records, juvenile
records, and all other court records available, as well as interviews with
anyone having a relationship to the defendant. The comprehensive life
history should also contain a complete mental and physical medical his-
tory, with particular emphasis on any accidents the defendant was
involved in, especially those resulting in head injuries or brain damage.
1
Once mental retardation is suspected, the next step is to request an
expert qualified in mental retardation pursuant to either Ake v.
Oklahoma2 or the Virginia expert assistance statute, Virginia Code sec-
tion 19.2-264.3:1, 3 to evaluate the defendant and verify the presence of
mental retardation. Given the courts' lack of familiarity with mental retar-
dation as compared with mental illness, special care must be used in
ensuring that the court appoints the right kind of expert. While a defen-
dant is not entitled to an expert of his choice under Ake nor under 3:1,
attorneys are encouraged to provide the court with a list of qualified men-
tal retardation experts from which to select an expert. Once mental retar-
dation is established, expert assistance is essential to challenge both the
voluntariness and the reliability of a confession. In this effort, the mental
retardation expert educates the court on the special susceptibilities of the
mentally retarded that make them especially vulnerable in the interroga-
tion context.
III. MENTAL RETARDATION DEFINED
"Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func-
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual func-
tioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of
the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safe-
ty, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests
before age 18."4 This definition, promulgated by the American
on Mental Deficiency, Classification in Mental Retardation 1 (Herbert J.
Grossman ed., 1983) [hereinafter AAMD, Classification], cited in James
W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants,
53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 446 (1985); cited with approval in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See also case summary of Penry, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2 (1989); discussion of Penry in Charles
F. Castner, The "Two-Edged" Sword: Mitigation Evidence Used in
Aggravation, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 40 (1993). Note
that because of its recency this definition may not be the one used in
much of the literature.
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Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR),5 has three elements. 6 First,
there must be a proven deficit in intellect which is measured by intelli-
gence tests and quantified as an intelligence quotient (IQ) score. The
AAMR's definition of mental retardation includes those with an IQ level
of 70 to 75 or below. 7 Second, an individual must concurrently suffer
impairments in two or more of the listed adaptive skills areas.8 Adaptive
behavior is generally defined as "significant limitations in an individual's
effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal
independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or her
age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and,
usually, standardized scales." 9 This impairment to adaptive behavior ele-
ment requires that the intellectual deficit have some practical effect on the
individual's life.t 0 In the past, particularly in criminal cases, diagnoses
have sometimes been challenged because the concept of adaptive behav-
ior could not be precisely defined. Its extension in this revised definition
to ten adaptive skill areas seeks to address this problem. 1 The third ele-
ment of mental retardation is that mental retardation must manifest itself
before the age of eighteen. 12 This requirement is somewhat arbitrary, and
some experts endorse disregarding the date of origin. The criminal justice
system generally concerns itself with the manifestations and conse-
quences of an individual's handicap and not the date of its origin.
13
Mental retardation is generally classified into four categories: mild,
moderate, severe, and profound. 14 Mildly retarded individuals, who com-
prise approximately eighty-nine percent of people classified as mentally
retarded, have IQ scores ranging between 55 and 70.15 The mildly retard-
ed are generally capable of functioning at minimal self-support levels and
of progressing to about a sixth grade level. Moderately retarded individ-
uals, having IQ scores ranging from 40-55, generally have great difficul-
ty dealing with social conventions and usually are not capable of pro-
gressing beyond the second grade level. Severely retarded individuals,
who comprise only four percent of all mentally retarded individuals, have
IQ scores ranging from 20-40 and are characterized by poor motor devel-
opment and severely limited speech. Persons with IQ scores between 75
and 85 are sometimes erroneously described as having "borderline retar-
5 Previously known as the American Association on Mental
Deficiency (AAMD).
6 According to the American Association on Mental Retardation, the
following four assumptions are essential to the application of the defini-
tion: (1) valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic diversity as
well as differences in communication and behavioral factors; (2) the exis-
tence of limitations in adaptive skills occurs within the context of com-
munity environments typical of the individual's age peers and is indexed
to the person's individualized needs for support; (3) specific adaptive
limitations often coexist with strengths in other adaptive skills or other
personal capabilities; and (4) with appropriate support over a sustained
period, the life functioning of the person with mental retardation will
generally improve. American Association on Mental Retardation, supra
note 4.
7 American Association on Mental Retardation, supra note 4. In its
new definition, the AAMR formally extended the upper limit to 75, while
previously the upper limit was 70 with the caution that it was intended as
a guideline and it could be extended upward through IQ 75. Also note
that the average IQ for the overall population is 100; more than 97 per-






13 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 423. Proof of this element,
dation," but this classification has long since been abandoned by profes-
sionals in the field. 16 Individuals with IQs in this range, while not men-
tally retarded, do have reduced cognitive ability, although the reduction
is not as severe as for those who have mental retardation. Practitioners
should note that mental disability that falls short of mental retardation is
still relevant when evaluating confessions. Despite these categories, it
should be emphasized, especially since most criminal defendants fall into
the mildly retarded category, that mental retardation at all of its levels is
a serious disability that affects every dimension of a person's life in var-
ious ways. Even mildly retarded individuals statistically place in the bot-
tom two percent of the population in intelligence.
17
IV. MENTAL RETARDATION AND MENTAL
ILLNESS DISTINGUISHED
Crucial to an understanding of mental retardation is how it contrasts
with mental illness. The two are often confused, leading to unfortunate
consequences for a criminal defendant. The American Psychiatric
Association defines "mental disorder" as "an illness with psychologic or
behavioral manifestations and/or impairment in functioning due to a
social, psychologic, genetic, physical/ chemical, or biologic disturbance.
The disorder is not limited to relations between the person and society.
The illness is characterized by symptoms and/or impairment in function-
ing." 18 The key difference between mental retardation and mental illness
is that mental retardation is not an illness. Mentally retarded individuals
have limited abilities, while mentally ill individuals suffer disturbances in
their thought processes and emotions. 19 This contrast between ability and
illness signals the correlating temporal distinction between the two.
Mental illness is potentially temporary, cyclical, or episodic, while men-
tal retardation involves a permanent impairment. 20 Therefore, legal rules
formulated to address mental illness may not be appropriate to deal with
the mentally retarded defendant. For example, psychiatric treatmeni
appropriate for a mentally ill person will do nothing to assist a mentally
retarded person who is not mentally ill.
however, dispels the myth that mental retardation can be "faked" by ai
adult criminal defendant.
14 Id. Mildly retarded people may be characterized as "educable,'
and moderately retarded people as "trainable." Evans, The Lives o
Mentally Retarded People 14 (1983).
15 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 422-23. See, e.g., 1 Worh
Health Organization, System Of International Classification Of Diseases
Clinical Modification 1098-99; American Psychiatric Association
Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders 36 (3rd ed
1980).
16 AAMD, Classification, supra note 4, at 6.
17 See testimony of Dr. Ruth Luckasson in Fairchild v. Lockhari
744 F. Supp. 1429, 1435-49 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
18 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 423, citing Americaj
Psychiatric Association, Psychiatric Glossary 89 (5th ed. 1980). The glos
sary does not separately define "mental illness," providing only a cross
reference to "mental disorder."
19 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 423.
20 Id. The label of mental retardation as "permanent" should be qual
ified by stating that the consequences of the mental impairment, includin
deficits in adaptive behavior, may be ameliorated through education ani
habilitation. See AAMD, Classification, supra note 4; Curative Aspects 0
Mental Retardation: Biomedical and Behavioral Advances (Menolascinc
et al., eds., 1983). But cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 87:
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (defining "mental defect" as "a condition which is no
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating ....").
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Some mentally retarded individuals are, however, also mentally ill.
Studies reveal that the incidence of mental illness among retarded people
is approximately thirty percent.2 1 This combination of mental illness and
retardation creates unique problems in the criminal justice context. For
example, if a defendant is institutionalized for the purpose of curing men-
tal illness so that the defendant can stand trial, the defendant will be
returned "sane," but will still be retarded. This situation is particularly
harmful to the defendant because there will be a recorded, official deter-
mination of sanity available to the prosecutor and the real problem of
retardation may not even be detected, let alone mentioned in the medical
evaluation since most psychiatrists are not trained in areas involving
mental retardation.
V. COMMON TRAITS IN MENTALLY
RETARDED INDIVIDUALS
While mentally retarded individuals vary widely, certain character-
istics frequently occur that have implications on the use of confessions in
the criminal justice system. Many mentally retarded people have limited
communication or memory skills exhibited by such behavior as unre-
sponsiveness to police or authority figures and confused responses to
police questioning. The mentally retarded pose unique challenges
because even when a mentally retarded individual's language and com-
munication abilities appear to be normal, the reliability of the answer
could still be questionable. Mentally retarded defendants are particularly
susceptible to what is sometimes called "biased questioning." "Biased
questioning" refers to answering in the affirmative questions regarding
behaviors they believe are desirable, and answering in the negative ques-
tions concerning behaviors they believe are prohibited. 22 The form of a
question can play an important role in producing an unreliable response
and, therefore, police interrogators may intentionally or inadvertently
elicit an inaccurate response through the use of an inappropriate question
form. 23 Furthermore, a mentally retarded individual will often not refuse
to answer questions which are beyond his ability to understand. Again,
outward appearance can be deceiving. While a mentally retarded defen-
dant may be able to verbalize effectively, memory will often be impaired
because the mentally retarded are unable to determine the importance of
various events so that cursory questioning cannot reliably ascertain the
facts.24 Memory impairment also causes mentally retarded individuals to
have trouble remembering previous answers to questions so that they
may be perceived as lying.
Second, mentally retarded individuals often exhibit a poor attention
span which creates problems throughout the criminal justice process.
With regard to confessions, mentally retarded defendants may be unable
to understand their rights when arrested. People with mental retardation
21 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 425, citing Menolascino,
7hallenges In Mental Retardation: Progressive Ideology and Services
126-27 (1977).
22 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 428, citing Rosen, et al.,
investigating the Phenomenon of Acquiescence in the Mentally
andicapped: 1 Theoretical Model, Test Development and Normative
Data, 20 Brit. J. Mental Subnormality 58, 58-68 (1974); see generally
'igdman, et al., When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews
vith Mentally Retarded Persons, 19 Mental Retardation 53 (1980).
23 Both "yes-no" questions and more difficult open-ended questions
)resent problems for the mentally retarded criminal defendant. While
'yes-no" questions are easiest for a mentally retarded person to answer,
heir validity is so suspect, given the danger of response bias, that it has
)een suggested that questioners abandon the use of "yes-no" questioning
echniques. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 428 n.73. See also Yeatts
also have problems with moral development which interferes with their
comprehension of blame or causation. This inability to distinguish
between blameworthy and accidental behavior may lead a mentally
retarded individual to confess to a crime that he did not commit because
he believes that blame should be assigned to someone and he does not
understand the concept of causation, or as is often common with the men-
tally retarded, he may confess to please his accuser. This phenomenon of
confessing to curry favor is termed "cheating to lose."
25
Mentally retarded individuals can also be characterized by their
denial of limitations stemming from their disability illustrated through
bragging about their skill, strength or deeds. This "overrating" results in
few mentally retarded people revealing their disability when arrested or
at other points in the criminal justice process.26 Given the dangers of
biased responses in questioning, this trait can lead to damaging and unre-
liable confessions. Finally, mentally retarded individuals are strongly
motivated by a desire to please authority figures such that they will go to
great lengths to seek their approval, even when it requires giving an
incorrect answer.27 This behavior suggests that mentally retarded defen-
dants are particularly vulnerable to suggestions by authority figures,
whether intentional or unintentional. Naturally, this behavior presents
compelling reliability concerns in the custodial interrogation context.
The mentally retarded individual's desire to deny his disability and
please others makes detection of his disability especially difficult. If men-
tal retardation is suspected, the defendant should be tested and a mental
health expert with experience in mental retardation should be involved
immediately. The involvement of a mental health expert to assist in the
preparation for trial is especially crucial in the case of the mentally retard-
ed defendant where his special traits and susceptibilities play an impor-
tant role in his defense. Early information on the defendant's mental
retardation and the use of a mental retardation expert as a defense con-
sultant is critical to the success of pre-trial motions and hearings which
shape the outcome of the trial.
VI. THE USE OF EXPERTS
The use of a mental health expert is critical to the defense of men-
tally retarded capital defendants, especially given the frequent confusion
between mental illness and mental retardation and the special character-
istics of mental retardation that can lead to unreliable confessions.
Before discussing the methods for acquiring a mental health expert, it
should be stressed that that an expert in mental retardation is needed.
Courts frequently fail to make the distinction between these experts and
ordinary psychiatrists and most psychologists are not trained in areas
involving mental retardation.
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254 (1991), and case sum-
mary of Yeatts, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 20 (1991). Yeatts
illustrates the dangers of "yes-no" questions where a defendant with an
IQ of 70 and a mental age of 12 or 13 in his fourth interview with police
was asked directly whether he "killed the woman," and replied, "[n]o, I
didn't... I mean yeah, I did." At the end of the interview, Yeatts asked
investigators for their "handshake." Id. at 129, 410 S.E.2d at 259.
24 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 428-29.
25 Id. at 430 n.79. See, e.g., President's Panel On Mental
Retardation, Report of the Task Force on Law 33 (1967); Person, The
Accused Retardate, 4 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 239, 254 (1972). See
generally Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally
Retarded Defendant: The Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a
Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 Cal. W. L. Rev. 365 (1981).
26 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 430.
27 Id. at 430-3 1.
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There is also the possibility of acquiring more than one expert. The
Virginia expert assistance statutory language, "the court shall appoint one
or more qualified mental health experts" can be used in suppport of this
position.28 An option to requesting more than one qualified mental retar-
dation expert initially is an incremental approach which uses a "rolling
Ake/3:l motion." Under this alternative, an attorney initially requests a
mental retardation expert who specializes in diagnosing mental retarda-
tion to conduct the intelligence tests and evaluations needed to determine
whether the defendant suffers a mental deficit. Once mental retardation is
established, the next step is to make another AkeI3:1 motion for a mental
retardation expert to use in the preparation of a defense and to testify at
trial.
A. Acquiring an expert under Ake
In Ake v. Oklahoma2 9 the Supreme Court held that where an indi-
gent defendant's sanity will be an issue at trial, the defendant is entitled
to a state-funded psychiatrist to conduct an examination and assist in the
evaluation and presentation of a defense if the defendant cannot other-
wise afford one. The rationale of Ake has been extended beyond cases
where sanity is at issue.30 Under Ake, the defendant must show that his
mental condition will be a significant factor at trial, an expert is necessary
for his defense, and that the trial will be unfair without an expert.
3 1
While no court has explicitly formulated a checklist of what must be
included in an Ake motion, the defendant must make a detailed and per-
suasive showing that an expert is necessary and that without one the
defendant will not receive a fair trial.32 Courts consider factors such as:
the type of expert; the type of assistance; name, qualifications, and fees
of the expert; the reasonableness of the cost; the objective and subjective
bases for the request; the legal necessity; the legal entitlement to defense
experts; and the inadequacy of available state experts.33 Supporting
information should be provided for all of these factors.
Seeking an Ake expert has several advantages, including that the
attorney is forced to develop a theory of mitigation almost as a condition
of receiving the appointment of the expert and once appointed, the expert
operates as a "defense consultant," assisting in the preparation and pre-
sentation of the defendant's case.34 The mental retardation expert can be
particularly valuable as a "defense consultant" given the variety of unique
challenges inherent in building a defense for a mentally retarded defen-
dant. The appointment may also benefit courts, given their relative unfa-
miliarity and confusion regarding mental retardation. Additionally,
unlike the Virginia expert assistance statute,35 under Ake, the defendant
28 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
29 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See Helen L. Konrad, Getting the Most and
Giving the Least from Virginia's "Mental Mitigation Expert" Statute,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 22 (1991); W. Lawrence Fitch,
Restrictions on the State's Use of Mental Health Experts in Capital
Trials, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 21 (1989); Elizabeth P.
Murtagh, Mitigation: The Use of a Mental Health Expert in Capital
Trials, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 16 (1989).
30 See Konrad, supra note 29.




35 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (1990) (entitlement is limited to
indigent defendants in capital cases; see section B, infra).
36 See Konrad, supra note 29.
37 Id.
38 Id. Neither does Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.
39 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
40 The statute has guarantees purporting to prohibit or limit the use
is not subject to reciprocal examination by the Commonwealth's expert.
Seeking a mental retardation expert under Ake also has disadvan-
tages. A detailed, substantiated, and persuasive showing of need is
required. 36 Yet, there is no "checklist" detailing a showing that will guar-
antee entitlement as a matter of law.37 Finally, Ake does not give the
defendant the right to appoint an expert of his own choosing, or even to
get funds to do so.
38
B. Acquiring an expert under Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1
Unlike the detailed showing required by Ake, the Virginia statute
requirements are much less stringent. To acquire an expert under Virginia
Code section 19.2-264.3:1, a defendant merely has to show that (1) he is
charged with or convicted of capital murder, and (2) he is indigent. 39 The
major disadvantage of obtaining an expert under 3:1 is that it can expose
the defense case in mitigation to pretrial discovery by the
Commonwealth. It also compels a capital defendant to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by submitting to exami-
nation by an expert appointed by the Commonwealth. 40 The defendant
may also be compelled to furnish the Commonwealth's experts with state-
ments made by the defendant to his expert or risk being precluded from
presenting evidence in mitigation as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
4 1
As with Ake, 3:1 does not grant defense counsel an expert of her
choice. However, the statute does clearly contemplate assistance to a par-
ticular defendant regarding his history, character, or mental condition.
42
In the case of suspected mental retardation, only an expert qualified in
mental retardation can provide this assistance. As a practical matter, nom-
ination to the court of such an expert by defense counsel will often result
in appointment. Investigation of potential mental health experts qualified
in mental retardation is especially important with regard to the mentally
retarded defendant since courts frequently fail to make the distinction
between mental illness and mental retardation and many mental health
experts are not trained in areas involving mental retardation.
VII. MIRANDAIEDWARDS AND THE MENTALLY
RETARDED DEFENDANT
In Miranda v. Arizona,43 the Supreme Court mandated that an
accused be advised of two fundamental constitutional rights before a cus-
todial interrogation. 44 Surrender of one's Miranda rights must be the
of anything derived from defendant's statements. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1(G) (1990). Unless defense counsel are extremely diligent, how-
ever, these provisions may not be enforced. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222,427 S.E.2d 379 (1993), and case summary
of Stewart, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 21 (1993); Savino
v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990), and case sum-
mary of Savino, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 15 (1990).
41 See Konrad, supra note 29. See also Elizabeth A. Bennett, Is
Preclusion Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 Unconstitutional?,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2 4 (1989) (arguing that a defen-
dant may have a right to have counsel present; that preclusion of evidence
in any event at a capital penalty trial may be unconstitutional, even if 3:1
is not complied with; and the statute itself prohibits use of the the defen-
dant's statements and limits the Commonwealth's expert).
42 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
43 384 U.S. 435 (1966).
44 The four warnings are really to advise of two constitutional
rights: (a) the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self incrim-
ination; and (b) the limited Fifth Amendment right to counsel to advise
on the exercise of (a).
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product of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.4 5 The court must
determine, in light of the totality of the circumstances, including not only
the details of the interrogation, but also the characteristics of the accused,
whether the statement of the accused was the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice, or whether the accused's will was over-
come and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.46 The
mental retardation of the accused is one factor to consider in making this
determination.47 Furthermore, in Edwards v. Arizona4 8 the Supreme
ourt held that when a suspect invokes his right under Miranda to con-
dt with an attorney prior to interrogation, the suspect "is not subject to
irther interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made avail-
)le to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
cchanges, or conversations with the police.' 49
The relevance of mental retardation to the validity of a confession is
ised on several considerations. First is the increased likelihood that the
:tarded person may be particularly susceptible to coercion and pressure
id, therefore, more likely to give a confession that is not truly voluntary,
., a mentally retarded person is much more likely to be "overborne and
s capacity for self-determination critically impaired. ' 50 Second is the
)ssibility that the suspect will make a false confession out of a desire to
ease someone perceived to be an authority figure. Lastly is a concern
at the retarded suspect does not understand, and may be incapable of
iderstanding, the ramifications of a confession and his right not to con-
ss.51
The first issue in applying the special concerns of the mentally
tarded defendant to the context of confessions is whether the retarded
ispect understands the concepts which constitute the warning.52 The
)ncept of "rights" and what it means to give them up, the idea that one
is the ability to refuse to answer questions posed by a person of great
45 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 435.
46 Yeatts, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254. See also case summary of
'atts, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p 20 (1991); Terrell v.
,mmonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 290, 403 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1991).
47 Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454,464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357
987); Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 564, 318 S.E.2d 386,
,0 (1984); Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577
984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985).
48 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
49 Id. at 484-85. See also Yeatts, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254, and
se summary of Yeatts, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 20
991) (holding that defendant with an IQ of 70 and a mental age of
'elve or thirteen validly initiated discussions with police when he
quested that a police investigator he had already spoken with on three
ior occasions "come over and talk to [him]" after Yeatts had asked the
urt to appoint counsel to represent him). See also Correll, 232 Va. 454,
;2 S.E.2d 352 (holding confession of defendant with IQ of 68 admissi-
, though he had invoked his right to counsel two days earlier, where
fendant "initiated" discussions with the police by stating he wanted to
plain the results of his polygraph test and validly waived his rights
spite his low intelligence, given his previous dealings with police and
iranda warnings).
50 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 446.
52 It has been suggested that the anxiety some retarded defendants
perience upon being arrested may reduce their ability to understand the
srning statement. Id. at 448, n.182, citing Curative Aspects of Mental
,tardation: Biomedical and Behavioral Advances, supra note 20, at 185.
53 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 448. See Toliver v. Gathright,
11 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding inadmissible the confes-
)n of defendant with IQ of 60 because he was not likely to have under-
authority, the notions of subsequent use of incriminating statements, the
right to counsel, and the concept that the suspect can delay answering
questions until a lawyer arrives are of some abstraction and difficulty,
especially when read in summary fashion, without elaboration.53 Even
mildly retarded individuals are generally unable to comprehend
complex ideas without detailed explanation. Comprehension is further
hindered by a mentally retarded person's limited vocabulary. Many
retarded people have a vocabulary so limited that they may not be able to
understand the warning even if they are familiar with its concepts.
54
If a mentally retarded defendant's lack of capacity to understand the
warnings is not detected at the time the confession is sought, it may work
to the serious disadvantage of the defendant by resulting in a damaging
confession. The fact that many of the indicators are often not pursued or
ignored, combined with the mentally retarded suspect's characteristics,
such as a denial of his limitations, makes detection difficult.55 Common
indicators include whether the suspect is literate, the suspect's education-
al background, indications of confusion and inconsistency, and the scope
of a suspect's vocabulary. 56 An issue related to failure to understand
rights is failure to understand the adversarial nature of prosecutions and
the concepts of trials and their consequences. 57 This may be a factor
because many mentally retarded defendants have led a life of isolation.
The most important issue with regard to mentally retarded defen-
dants involves the voluntariness of the confession. The concern with this
requirement is that the defendant's action, either a confession or a waiv-
er of the right to counsel, was the product of coercion.58 The Supreme
Court has warned in Rhode Island v. Innis5 9 of the "unusual susceptibil-
ity of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion." The characteristics
of the mentally retarded make them particularly susceptible to coercion.
As the President's Panel on Mental Retardation observed:
stood his rights). See also Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th
Cir. 1972) (finding substantial uncontroverted testimony that the defen-
dant with an IQ of approximately 60 was not capable of meaningfully
comprehending the Miranda warning).
54 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 448.
55 In Morrow, A Legal Framework: An Insider's Perspective,
Rehabilitation and the Retarded Offender 60-61 (P. Browning ed. 1976),
the author notes that "[a]pparently the question, 'Can you read?' is rarely
asked." The mechanisms that a retarded person has used all his life to
minimize the stigma that accompanies his disability may make identifi-
cation of this problem a little more difficult. Morrow depicts a scene in
which the defendant, in his desire to please the police officer, makes a
statement. The police officer normally writes down the statement, reads
it back, says "something to the effect of 'read this over.., is it right?'
and requests the accused's signature. Sometimes the retarded person will
appear to read the document to himself, but in fact, will not read it at all."
Morrow, A Legal Framework: An Insider's Perspective, Rehabilitation
and the Retarded Offender, at 60-61, cited in Ellis & Luckasson, supra
note 4, at 449 n.190.
56 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 449-50.
57 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 450 n.195, noted that while-
the Supreme Court observed: "This Court has never embraced the theory
that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions viti-
ates his voluntariness," Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1984), Elstad
and the decisions it cites involve marginal misunderstandings by defen-
dants who were mentally typical. The "ignorance of the full conse-
quences" of a mentally retarded defendant may be different in kind, not
just degree, from those envisioned by the Elstad majority.
58 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 450.
59 446 U.S. 291, 302 n.8 (1980).
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The retarded are particularly vulnerable to an atmosphere of
threats and coercion, as well as to one of friendliness designed
to induce confidence and cooperation. A retarded person may
be hard put to distinguish between the fact and the appearance
of friendliness. If his life has been molded into a pattern of
submissiveness, he will be less able than the average person to
withstand normal police pressures. Indeed they may impinge
on him with greater force because their lack of clarity to him,
like all unknowns, renders them more frightening. Some of the
retarded are characterized by a desire to please authority: if a
confession will please, it may be gladly given. "Cheating to
lose," allowing others to place blame on him so that they will
not be angry with him, is a common pattern among the sub-
missive retarded. It is unlikely that a retarded person will see
the implications or consequences of his statements in the way
a person of normal intelligence will.
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A. Battling the "Prior Experience with the Criminal Justice
System" Myth
The unfamiliarity of most courts with mental retardation and its
implications is evident in the courts' responses to mentally retarded
defendants, especially in the area of confessions. In a string of cases the
Virginia courts have relied on the mentally retarded defendants' "prior
dealings with the police and Miranda' 6 1 or the defendant's "street
sense' 62 to find that the mentally retarded defendant knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived his rights.63 These conclusions negate the
very permanence that defines mental retardation and distinguishes it from
its only slightly less misunderstood counterpart, mental illness. Mental
retardation is characterized by limited ability, so that a series of repetitive
experiences do not improve the capacity of the mentally retarded defen-
dant. Repetitive exposure to warnings could teach a mentally retarded
individual some familiarity with the litany but repetitive exposure, partic-
ularly in a person who has mental retardation, is not going to create under-
standing. 64 Understanding, to the extent it exists at all on something as
complex as Miranda warnings, would have to be the result of sustained
training and treatment by qualified individuals using special education
methods.
6 5
60 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 451-52; President's Panel on
Mental Retardation, Report of the Task Force on Law 33 (1963).
61 See Washington, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (defendant with IQ
of 69 but prior experience in dealing with the criminal justice system was
found to have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights);
Correll, 232 Va. at 464, 352 S.E.2d at 357 (defendant with IQ of 68 found
to have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights based on a
number of prior dealings with the police and Miranda warnings).
62 Simpson, 227 Va. at 564, 318 S.E.2d at 390 (defendant with an IQ
of 78 but with "too much street sense to confess to something he had not
done" was capable of understanding his rights and intelligently waiving
them).
63 See also United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979) (waiver valid because of defendant's
prior experience with police even though his IQ of 67 was in bottom one
percentile of society), further illustrating that courts grossly misconstrue
the relevance of "street sense" to confessions of the mentally retarded.
64 Fairchild, 744 F. Supp. at 1435-49 (testimony of Dr. Ruth
Luckasson).
65 Id.
66 See Terrell, 12 Va. App. at 292, 403 S.E.2d at 391 (concluding
that confession of defendant with IQ of 71-75 was admissible despite
deceptive remarks by police since the police remarks were not such to
The appreciation of this truth is further complicated by the mentally
retarded individual's desire to please authority and his constant attempt
to deny his disability. The mentally retarded individual's well-developed
mechanisms to deny it and avoid the stigma that accompanies his dis-
ability present a dangerous facade to the police and the court, causing
them to overlook the individual's disability and treat him no differently
than they would treat an ordinary defendant. The courts have a particu-
larly difficult time grasping the concept that someone would confess to a
crime he did not commit.66 However, the mentally retarded are charac-
terized by their tendency to confess to crimes they did not commit.67 This
characteristic often stems from a sense of responsibility for things that go
wrong, which is nurtured by a life full of failures.
This myth that a mentally retarded defendant is capable of giving a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver because of his previous expe-
rience with the criminal justice system illustrates the special difficulties
associated with defending a mentally retarded individual and emphasizes
the need to acquire a mental health expert with experience in mental
retardation early in the litigation process. Not only is mental retardation
highly susceptible to being confused with the more familiar characteris-
tics of mental illness, but also many of the character traits of the mental-
ly retarded cloak the defendant's underlying condition, making courts
skeptical of the individual's condition.
VIII. WASHINGTON v. MURRAY: A DRAMATIC
VIRGINIA EXAMPLE
Earl Washington's story 68 most poignantly illustrates the criminal
justice system's failure to address the unusual susceptibilities of mental-
ly retarded defendants in the police interrogation context. Washington, a
black man with an IQ of 69, was convicted of the rape and capital mur-
der of Rebecca Lynn Williams largely based on his confession; the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.
69
The district court denied Washington's federal habeas Strickland v.
Washington70 ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his attor-
ney's failure to introduce exculpatory forensic evidence, but the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded. 7 1 The district court on remand again
found that Washington had not received ineffective assistance of counsel
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although counsel had
cause an innocent person to falsely confess). See also Simpson, 227 Va.
at 564, 318 S.E.2d at 390 (finding confession of defendant with IQ of 78
admissible because he had "too much street sense to confess to something
he had not done").
67 See discussion of Washington infra, and case summary of
Washington, Capital Defense Digest, this issue, pointing out that Earl
Washington likewise confessed to other crimes which the police deter-
mined he could not have committed.
68 4 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1993). See also case summary of
Washington, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. Also note that the gover-
nor has since commuted Earl Washington's sentence to life in prison
based on exculpatory DNA evidence.
69 Washington, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577, cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1111.
70 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a two-prong standard of review
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims with a performance prong con-
sidering "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the
circumstances" and a prejudice prong measuring whether "there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.")
71 Washington v. Murray (Washington 1), 952 F.2d 1472 (4th Cir.
1991).
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failed the performance prong of the Strickland ineffective assistance of
counsel test, the defendant had failed to show the requisite degree of prej-
udice caused by the failure. 72 Washington's confession was instrumental
in the court's determination that "the prosecution still had a strong case"
had the forensic evidence been introduced and, therefore, the prejudice
prong was not met.73 Despite numerous discrepancies in Washington's
confession, the Court of Appeals affirmed the state court's decision in a
pretrial suppression hearing that Washington had knowingly, intelligent-
y, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making the confes-
ion.
74
The unusual susceptibilities of a mentally retarded defendant are
lustrated by Washington's confession which occurred over a two day
eriod and was in response to specific questions and suggestions (later
educed to written form), rather than as a volunteered narrative.
75
WIashington's confession contained numerous original factual errors
ncluding the race of the victim, the injury inflicted, the absence of any
)thers at the crime scene (two children were present), and the location of
he victim's apartment-all later corrected by further questions and sug-
;estions.76 Washington also confessed to other crimes which the police
letermined he could not have committed, illustrating the special dangers
;urrounding mentally retarded individuals' tendencies to confess to
:rimes they did not commit. The Court of Appeals nevertheless relied on
he confessions as the main basis of affirmance despite expert medical
estimony, offered at state habeas, that Washington's psychological state
vas such that he was highly suggestible, "easily led," and that "out of his
ieed to please and his relative incapacity to determine what is socially
md personally appropriate, he relies on cues given by others and reflex-
ve affability.
' 77
Washington's case illustrates the courts' unfamiliarity with mental
•etardation and the continued confusion between it and mental illness.
vloreover, it emphasizes the need to get a mental retardation expert
nvolved in the preparation of the case early. At Washington's pretrial
iearing to suppress the confession, the court found that he had the capac-
ty to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights based on his
,wo previous encounters with the criminal justice system and Miranda as
i juvenile.78 This reliance on Washington's repetitive exposure to wam-
ngs contradicts established knowledge that while repetitive exposure to
mamings could teach a mentally retarded individual a familiarity with the
itany, repetitive exposure in a person who has mental retardation is not
,oing to create understanding. Furthermore, at trial the Commonwealth's
-xpert testified that Washington had the "capacity to appreciate the
iature, character and consequences of his acts and the difference between
ight and wrong," obviously confusing the test for insanity with that for
-etardation.
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72 Washington v. Murray (Washington II), 4 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir.
1993).
73 Id. at 1290. The court concluded that even had the forensic evi-
dence been introduced, the prosecution had a strong case based solely on
Washington's confession and with his admitted ownership of a shirt
linked to the crime scene. However, although Washington admitted own-
-rship of the shirt, laboratory reports showed that hairs in the shirt were
consistent with the hair of James Pendleton, the original suspect. See
Washington I, 952 F.2d at 1478-79 for a full discussion of the contradic-
tory evidence surrounding the shirt.
IX. CONCLUSION
The unique characteristics of mental retardation make it hard to
identify. Therefore, one's own interaction with a client often is not a reli-
able indicator. It is always a good policy to test a defendant, especially
when certain indicators are present such as school records which show
consistently deficient IQ test performance, poor grades, recommenda-
tions for special education, repeated grades, and a general trend of fail-
ure. Attorneys can also rely on information from family and friends who
have a wide range of experience with the defendant over a long period of
time and are better able to measure his abilities.
Once mental retardation is suspected, an expert qualified in mental
retardation is crucial. Given the courts' lack of familiarity and confusion
regarding the distinctions between mental retardation and mental illness,
special measures should be taken to ensure that the expert appointed is
one qualified in mental retardation. Although a defendant is not entitled
to an expert of his choice under Ake nor under 3:1, attorneys may provide
the court with a list of qualified mental retardation experts to assist in
appointing a qualified expert and stress to the court the critical nature of
acquiring the right kind expert assistance.
Expert assistance is especially valuable in the effort to convince the
court that the special susceptibilities of the mentally retarded make them
particularly vulnerable to both intentionally coercive police tactics and
inadvertent interrogation techniques. In this effort, experts are used to
illustrate the characteristics of the mentally retarded that challenge both
the voluntariness and the reliability of a confession. These include his
desire to please authority and acquiesce to authority figures; his denial of
disability and the well-developed mechanisms the mentally retarded use
to disguise their disability or "pass"; and the tendency of the mentally
retarded to confess to crimes they did not commit.
Finally, attorneys should be ready to confront the Virginia courts'
willingness to accept the repeated exposure or "street smarts" fallacy
regarding a mentally retarded individual's ability to understand his rights
after repeated exposure. The permanence of mental retardation as a limi-
tation of ability that cannot be cured must be stressed to courts. The most
effective method to use in persuading the courts is the testimony of qual-
ified mental retardation experts emphasizing to the courts that while
repeated exposure may improve familiarity it does not create under-
standing. The injustice of cases like that of Earl Washington dictates that
attorneys and the courts make a greater effort to understand the legal
implications of mental retardation, especially with regard to to the capi-
tal defendant.
74 Washington 11, 4 F.3d at 1290.
75 Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1478 n.5. See also supra note 23, dis-
cussing the dangers of suggestive questions.
76 Washington I, 952 F. 2d at 1478 n.5.
77 Id.
78 Washington, 228 Va. at 546, 323 S.E.2d at 584, cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1111.
79 Id. at 546, 323 S.E.2d at 585.
